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The most rigorous extensive theory of bureaucratic behavior 
yet developed is contained in William Niskanen' s Bureaucracy and Repre-
sentative Government. Niskanen' s theory has numerous and important 
derivations explaining significant aspects of bureaucratic behavior, 
but even more importantly, it demonstrates the basic advantages of 
deductive methodology, By clearly and precisely stating its assump-
tions, Niskanen 1 s theory invites falsificat'ion and correction in a 
way that can hopefully lead to a cumulative body of knowledge about 
bureaucratic organizations. 
Already a fairl:: large body of literature has developed 
using Niskanen' s theory as a starting point, showing how changes in 
Niskanen' s assumptions can lead to a more realistic, yet still rigorous 
theory of bureaucratic behavior.1 This paper will review some of the 
more important elabvrations of Niskanen 1 s theory to date and suggest 
a still more fundamental alteration of the assumption set, Basically, 
*The author, an assistant professor at California Institute of 
Technology, wishes to express his appreciation to Joe Oppenheimer and 
Norman Frohlich for their helpful advice and encouragement during work 
on early drafts of this paper, and to William Niskanen for his thought-
ful critique and suggestions. 
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this paper will argue that the bureau head' s supply decision cannot 
be regarded as an isolated decision, constrained by a fixed budget-
output schedule, Rather, the bureau head' s supply decision and the 
sponsor' s budget appropriation decision must be analyzed in strategic 
interaction. This perspective suggests a game-theoretic model and 
permits the analyst to ask qu.estions about the uniqueness and effi­
ciency of joint solutions that are difficult or impossible to inves-
tigate with simpler models. 
I. NISKANEN' S BASIC MODEL 
Niskanen' s basic model consists of the head of a govern-
mental bureau acting under a budget constraint given by 
B (1) 
where B is the budget which the bureau' s sponsor is willing to grant 
the bureau for a given expected level of output Q by the bureau 
(Niskanen, p. 25). The budget constraint is the in�egral of the 
demand function for that bureau' s output by the bureau' s sponsor. 
Niskanen also assumes an increasing marginal cost function of the form 
TC 2 cQ + dQ • (2) 
Niskanen' s bureau head is presumed to value such things as 
salary, the perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, 
patronage, the output of the bureau, and the ease of managing the 
bureau. Almost all these things are assumed to be positively 
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associated with the size of the bureau' s budget, Niskanen' s bureau 
head is then presumed to maximize the budget of the bureau in order 
to maximize his utility. Since the budget is at a maximum when Q is 
equal to a/2b, this is the bureau head' s choice of output as long as 
total costs (TC) are less than the budget at this budget-maximizing 
output. 
However, if TC is greater than the budget when Q is at a/2b, 
then the budget-maximizing bureau head will decide on a level of output 
which assures equality of budget and total costs, By setting B equal to 
TC, we discover that the bureau head will then decide on an output equal 
to 
Q (a - c) (b + d) (3) 
This result, Niskanen suggests, indicates that the primary problem 
with bureaucracy is oversupply since it is larger than the output 
which would maximize net vn.lue to the legislative sponsor. 
II. THE MANAGERIAL DISCRETION CRITIQUE OF NISKANEN' S MODEL 
Jean-Luc Migue and Gerard Belanger have criticized, or 
rather generalized, the basic behavforal assumption of Niskanen' s 
model. While Niskanen assumed that the things valued by the bureau 
head are intrinsic to the budget and that the bureau head must there-
fore maximize his budget, Migue and Belanger argue that one should 
differentiate between the bureau' s output and all other budget-related 
perquisites of the office. Some bureau heads may value the bureau' s 
output independently of the rewards of office, and their behavior will 
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be different from those bureau heads who derive no intrinsic satis-
faction from the bureau' s output. An output-maximizing bureau head 
will devote his budget co the actual costs of producing the output 
(call this concept TCQ) , while other bureau heads may spend less than 
the entire budget on TCQ in order to have a fund for other purposes 
(called the managerial discretionary profit, or MDP) . 
Since the managerial discretionary profit is·equal to the 
difference between the size of the budget and the amount of the budget 
actually spent on producing the bureau' s output, then from equations 
1 and 2 we can write 
MDP 2 
2 aQ - bQ - cQ - dQ • (4) 
By differentiation, the level of output that maximizes managerial 
discretionary profit will be 
Q (a - c) 2 (b + d) 
(5) 
This is the level of output that will be achieved PY a bureau head 
who values only those things which can be achieved through managerial 
profit. This result may be compared with Niskanen's predicted output 
in figure 1. The managerial discretionary profit is the distance 
between the budget lines and the total cost lines; as the illustration 
shows, the distance between these lines is maximized at that level of 
output specified in equation 5. The problem with this level of output 
is not overproduction, but inefficiency, since the sponsor' s most-. 
preferred level of output is achieved, but at a budget cost to the 
sponsor larger than actual production costs. 
B, 
TCQ 
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Budget-Maximizing and Profit-Maximizing Levels of Outputs 
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This analysis leaves us with two possible ideal-type bureau-
crats: the one who maximizes the budget of the agency and the one 
who maximizes only managerial discretionary profit. But as Migue 
and Belanger point out, it is possible to have a bureau head who 
values both, to varying degrees, That is, the agency pead's utility 
may be described as a function of both B and MDP. But since the budget 
is assumed to be strictly a function of output, then it is also possible 
to say that the agency head's utility is a function of output and MDP: 
f (Q,MDP) . (6) 
A particular agency head's choice of output level will be anywhere 
between the limits defined·by the ideal-type budget-maximizing and profit-
maximizing models. 
III. WHAT ABOUT THE LEGISLATURE? 
Migue and Belanger make what I feel is an important contri-
bution to Niskanen's theory by making it allow for· perfectly realistic 
alternative motivational bases for agency heads. However, as in 
Niskanen' s model, Migue and Belanger leave no room for legislative 
impact on the final output of the agency other than setting the budget 
constraint which informs the agency head's decision, While the agency 
head can choose any level of output that maximizes his utility, the 
legislature has no way of influencing that decision in the context of 
a given demand function. The bureau head, according to both Niskanen 
and Migue and Belanger, can put any proportion of the total budget into 
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actual production costs or perquisites of the office, while the legis-
lature is given no opportunity to react to either "oversupply" or profit-
maximizing" behavior on the part of the agency head. This, I believe, 
is the most fundamental weakness of Niskanen's theory. It allows for 
none of the bargaining between legislative sponsor and agency head 
which observers find so prominent a characteristic of the budget 
process. 
Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe address the problem of 
the legislature in yet another note on Niskanen's theory. As they 
argue, the "basic flaw" in the argument is "that sponsors are com-
pletely passive. Politicians interested in their reelection will 
obviously attempt to exploit their position as monopsony buyers of 
the bureau's output.112 }lreton and Wintrobe suggest that we imagine 
agency heads as being subject to hierarchical controls from the govern-
. l' . 1 3 1ng po 1t1ca party. The governing political party is assumed to be 
capable of getting information about the true total cost curve facing 
the agency head, at some cost. 
If this is the case, what would be the most preferred out-
come for the party in power? If the budget line is interpreted as 
the total evaluation function of the output of the agency, then the 
party in power would pref er the level of output pref erred by the 
profit-maximizing bureau head, but at a budget cost equal to the true 
cost at that level. That is, they would like to assume the MDP for. 
themselves, where MDP is of course interpreted broadly now as "net 
benefit." 
The possibility that the legislature will be able to 
regain some of the net benefit or consumer surplus generated by 
the production of Q requires some additional terminology. In 
figure 2 what was formerly called the budget line is now called 
the sponsor's total evaluation curve (TE). The difference between 
the total evaluation and total costs at any point is called the 
surplus (S) . The actual budget will fall between the total cost 
curve and the total evaluation curve, splitting the surplus into 
two parts. The part retained by the agency head is again mana-
gerial discretionary profit, The part regained by the legislature 
is regained net benefit. 
Breton and Wintrobe assume that it is possible to get 
back their part of the surplus by spending resources on control 
devices. Figure 3 illustrates such a situation. In figure 3, the 
total cost of control devices (called TCD) is shown as a sharply 
rising curve, while the regained net benefit (NB) is shown as 
increasing at a decreasing rate with respect to the quantity of 
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·control devices (D), The party in power will produce control devices 
until the slopes of the two·lines are equal, 
IV. A CRITIQUE OF ONE-SIDED EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS
Breton and Wintrobe also use their assumptions to arrive 
at an "equilibrium size of the bureau's budget, given the availability 
and use of antidistortion devices.114 In doing so, I feel they make 
the mirror image of the mistake they accuse Niskanen of making. 
While they claim that Niskanen is incorrect to assume a passive 
TE, 
TCQ 
NB 
B TCQ 
MOP 
Q 
Figure 2 
Net Benefit and Managerial Discretionary Profit 
Determined by Legislative Budget Decision 
9 
NB, 
TCD 
TCD 
Figure 3 
Cost of Control Devices and Regained Net Benefit 
as a Function of Quantity of Control Devices 
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legislature, Breton and Wintrobe seem to assume a passive agency head. 
While Niskanen's equilibrium level of output is determined by a decision 
of the agency head alone, Breton and Wintrobe's equilibrium is deter­
mined by the legislature alone. Both Niskanen and Breton and Wintrobe 
fail to consider the more complex possibility that the final result 
is determined by both the governing political party and the agency 
head in a bargaining context. One cannot determine the budget outcome 
just by looking at the preferences of one player or another; the 
players are engaged in a game. 
Niskanen and Breton and Wintrobe propose a unique equilibrium 
solution where one very well may not exist. Does this mean that the 
budget process is, in the final outcome, unanalyzable in any rigorous 
sense? Obviously not; it simply means that, we must not impose certain 
kinds of solutions where more complex ones may be necessary. We must 
use those analytical techniques that have been developed for bargain.-
ing situations and which leave open the question of equilibria, unique 
or otherwise. The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to demon­
strate the use and applicability of a kind of game-theoretic analysis 
to the problem addressed by Niskanen, Migue and Belanger, and Breton 
and Wintrobe. It is hoped that this type of analysis will much more 
closely approximate the budget process than the single-actor decisions 
modeled heretofore, and thµt this analysis will permit more complex 
and interesting questions to be asked of the model -- questions dealing 
with the uniqueness and Pareto optimality of equilibrium results. 
V. GAMES ON THE UNIT SQUARE AND THEIR POLITICAL APPLICATIONS 
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I propose that our starting point be the assumption that 
both the agency head and the party in power determine the output of 
the agency. The party in power does this by deciding how much money 
to appropriate to the agency; the agency head decides how much of 
its budget is actually spent·on producing Q. 
Each player therefore has an infinite number of choices 
along his strategy dimension. Games with an infinite but countable 
number of pure strategies are difficult to handle. For instance, 
the game which rewards the individual who can choose the highest 
integer does not have a solution since there are an infinite, unbounded, 
but countable number of strategy choices for each player. However, 
games with infinite and uncountable strategies, such as games whose 
strategy sets can be represented by all the points on a bounded line 
segment, do have solutions. If the assumption is made that each player's 
pure strategies form a continuum represented by the interval (for example) 
from zero to one, the game is called a game on the unit square (for two-
person games) , 
The political applications of infinite games up to the 
present time have involved zero-sum infinite games. For instance, 
the use of infinite games has allowed Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook 
to develop a more parsimonious set of assumptions with which to 
d . 1 . 5 exorcise the voters' paradox devil from emocratic e ections. On the
other hand, there seem to be no applications of nonzero-sum infinite 
games to politics. The problem of obtaining bureaucratic compliance 
would seem to be an ideal setting for such an application. 
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What are the potential advantages of such an application? 
Infinite game analysis allows for the possibility of a unique equilib-
rium solution as sought by Niskanen, Migue and Belanger, and Breton 
and Wintrobe. However, it does not impose one. Instead, it also 
allows for multiple equilibria, unstable equilibria, divergent games, 
mixed strategy solutions, and even prisoners' dilemmas, all of which 
may well occur in the actual world of bureaucratic-legislative relations. 
Further, certain mathematical theorems allow us to predict what kinds 
of solutions will occur in given conditions. Hypothetical, but plausible 
conditions, are explored in the next section. 
VI. BUREAUCRATIC COMPLIANCE AS A GAME
Let us view the relationship bet"•}en the party in power and 
the head of a bureaucratic agency as a game. The agency head has a 
strategy dimension, let us call it H, which goes from 0 to 1. Any 
particular strategy, h, denotes the proportion of his total budget, B, 
which he actually dedicates to the production of the agency output, Q. 
The party in power naturally wants the agency head to choose h = �' 
using all the budget for the production of the formally authorized 
output, Q. The problem then is one of compliance, unless the agency 
head is an ideal-type output-maximixing bureaucrat. 
The governing party has a strategy dimension as well, which 
may be denoted by G and which also goes from 0 to 1. Any particular 
strategy, g, is interpretable as that proportion of R (where R is the 
total resources available for the service provided by the agency in 
question) which the governing party actually decides to appropriate 
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for that agency. Thus, the product, gR, is equal to the agency budget, 
B. Neglecting the kind of explicit control devices suggested by Breton 
and Wintrobe, the use o� R ean itself be viewed as a reward-punishment 
dimension for influencing agency behavior, The larger proportion of R 
that is spent on the budget, the greater the reward, while the larger 
proportion of R that is kept in reserve, the greater the punishment 
effect, 
We may note that the parameter R, the strategy choices g 
and h, and the cost-output function completely determine the system. 
For instance, let us imagine that R $10, 000 if the governing party 
chooses g of one-half, then the budget will equal $5,000, If the agency 
head selects h = . 72, then $3,600 will be spent on the production of Q, 
and $1,400 will be left as managerial discretionary profit. If the 
cost-output function is $50 (Q) + $.25 (Q2) + $2500, then Q will be 
equal. to 2{TCQ - 100, or °(for this example) , 20 units.
VII. PAYOFF FUNCTIONS AND CHOICE OF STRATEGY
How then do the governing party and the agency head make 
their choice of strategies? In order to make a choice they must have 
an understanding of the payoffs associated with their choices. 
For instance, let us look at the payoff function for the 
governing party, which will be denoted by M • The party is presumably g 
seeking to maximize its net benefit, which is found by subtracting 
budget expenditures from its total evaluation of the agency's output. 
Retaining Niskanen's evaluation function, we obtain 
M g 
2 aQ - bQ - B 
More complex payoff functions may certainly be assumed without 
changing the general nature of the following discussion. 
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(7) 
The agency head may get some pleasure from both agency 
output and from managerial profit, as pointed out by Migue and 
Belanger. We may write, in its most general form, 
Mh (Q,MDP) . (8) 
We should note that all the arguments in both payoff functions are 
expressible in terms of the parameters and the strategy choices: 
B = gR; 
MDP = (1 - h) B = (1 - h)gR; . 
Q = f (TCQ) = f (ghR) . 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
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increasing marginal cost and the assumption that the payoff is the 
difference between the evaluation of the produced good by the party 
and the costs incurred by the sponsor. 
Similarly, if the agency head has decreasing marginal 
evaluation of the good and of managerial profit, the concavity assump-
tion for � in H will also be met. 
Having argued that at least one set of equilibrium strate-
gies is likely, can it also be shown that there is a unique equilibrium? 
Nikaido and Isoda have also demonstrated that additional conditions 
establish the uniqueness of equilibrium; For the present problem, 
Mg must be convex in H and � must be convex in G. 
I would argue that this condition will probably not be met. 
For instance, let us look again at M • If the governing party behaves g 
as if it were maximizing net benefit, as we suppose, and as long as 
the party in power has decreasing marginal evaluation of Q, M will beg 
concave rather than convex in H. This means that it is impossible to 
establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in the bureaucratic compliance 
VIII. THE QUESTION OF EQUILIBRIA game despite Niskanen's attempt to find just such an equilibrium. 
When may we say a pure equilibrium strategy exists? An 
important game-theoretic result shows that if M is concave in G andg 
if � is concave in H, then at least one pair of strategies exists 
that results in equilibrium.6 Given what we know about bureaucratic 
behavior, is this likely? 
With a cost function of the sort proposed by Niskanen and 
a net benefit-maximizing governing party as in equation 8, the concavity 
assumptions are indeed met. This is because of the assumption of 
IX. THE QUESTION OF PARETO OPTIMALITY
An example serves to show that equilibria, even when a unique 
equilibrium exists, may not be Pareto optimal for the players in this 
game of bureaucratic compliance. 
For instance, let us maintain the net benefit-maximizing 
payoff function postulated for the legislative sponsor: 
M g 
2 aQ - bQ - B. (12) 
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A somewhat similar payoff function for the agency head is 
a'Q - b'Q2 + MDP. (13) 
Total resources available to the party for the service in question 
are still equal to R, and constant marginal costs are assumed: 
TCQ cQ. 
Substituting for Q, B, and TCQ in M , we obtain g 
M g 
2 2 a (ghR/c) - b (ghR) /c - gR. 
Similar substitutions for � yield 
� = a'�hR _ b'(g�R) 2 + g (l _ h)R.
c 
By differentiating with respect to g, we obtain the slope of the 
payoff function for the governing party with respect to its own 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
strategy dimension. SetU.ng the result equal to zero and solving 
for g yields a reaction curve for the governing party in terms of 
the agency head's strategy dimension: 
g cah - c
2 
2bRh2 
(17) 
A similar manipulation yields a reaction curve for the agency head 
in terms of the governing party' s strategy dimension: 
h c<.1' - c
2 
2b'Rg 
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(18) 
Solving for these two reaction curves yields any equilibria position. 
In the case of the payoff functions hypothesized in the example, the 
equilibrium strategies are 
g 
and 
h 
(a' - c) (ab' - a'b +be) 
2R (b' ) 2 
·b'c 
ab' - a' b +be ' 
(19) 
(20) 
As a numerical example, let us take the sponsor's evaluation 
function to be 200 (Q) - (l/2) (Q2) as in an example by Niskanen (p,49 ) ,
The sponsor' s ultimate payoff function is simply 
M g 200 (Q) - (l/2) (Q
2) - B. (21) 
Let us assume that the bureau head has. an evaluation of Q equal to 
SO (Q) - (l/8) Q2, and his payoff function is
SO(Q) - (l/8) (Q2) +  MDP. (22) 
The resources available to the sponsor for Q are equal to $4800, and 
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one unit of Q is produced for every $48 actually spent on the production 
of Q by the agency head. 
With these parameters, equilibrium occurs when the sponsoring 
party spends about 32 percent of its resources, or $1536 on the agency'� 
budget, and the agency spends about one-quarter of the budget on the 
production of Q. This means that $384 are spent on the production of 
Q, and so eight units of Q are produced. This level of output is. 
valued by the sponsor at $1568, yet it. had to pay $1536 for the budget; 
it therefore received a net payoff of only $32. At equilibrium the 
agency head evaluates this level of production intrinsically at $392 
and, in addition, �ad a managerial profit of $1152. 
On the other hand, notice what would have been the payoff if 
they could have agreed on the nonequilibrium solution at which 100 percent 
of the resources go into the agency budget, and 100 percent of the agency 
budget goes into production of Q.7 In this situation, one hundred units
of Q would be produced, for a net payoff to the sponsor of $10,200, as 
opposed to $392. The agency head's payoff, even with no managerial 
profit, would be equal to $3750. Thus, both players would have been 
better off at a nonequilibrium strategy pair. They are in a prisoners' 
dilemma. 
X. PARETO OPTIMALITY: 
A COMMON CHARACTERiSTIC OF COMPLIANCE.SITUATIONS?
This last example suggests the possibility that prisoners' 
dilemmas may occur in other bureaucratic relationsh�ps. Surely, for 
instance, the agency head has subordinates who have their own.goals 
20 
which might be different from those of either the agency head or 
the legislative sponsor. These subordinates may be playing similar 
compliance-type games with the agency head. Is it possible that 
these games might be Pareto suboptimal for these players as well? 
There are certain characteristics of a generalized supervisor-
subordinate relationship that suggest the possibility of built-in 
suboptimality. These characteristics are the following: 
1. The superior tends to have a set of incentives available to him 
with which to reward subordinate behavior (e. g. special funds, 
time off, etc.') . These rewards tend to be increasingly costly 
to the supervisor after a certain level of expenditure, but they 
are not so costly to him as is noncompliance on the part of the 
subordinate. 
2. The subordinate has some compliance dimension available to him 
(output measure, probability of compliance with a set of rules) . 
Increasing compliance is costly to him, but not so costly as
failure to be rewarded by the superior. 
In other words, both the superior and the subordinate are 
in a situation in which a change in either person's strategy dimension 
affects each player in opposite ways (increased compliance is costly 
to the subordinate but very welcome to the supervisor) . Further, each 
person is more affected by changes in his opponent's strategy dimension 
than he is by changes in his own strategy dimension. Thus, the superior 
can be hurt more by noncompliance on the part of the subordinate than 
he can be helped by economizing on the flow of rewards. Similarly, the 
subordinate can be hurt more by failure to get rewards from the superior 
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than he can be helped by cutting back on his degree of compliance. 
Let us see what these conditions mean in terms of a simple 
compliance game. Just two points on each strategy dimension are 
illustrated in figure 4: moderate and high compliance on the part 
of the subordinate, and moderate and high rewards on the part of 
the supervisor. The superior would most prefer to be in box B, 
because he could obtain a tligh degree of compliance for only a moderate 
expenditure in reward resources. However, if he had to choose between 
boxes A and C, he would prefer A because (as was mentioned above) a 
reduction in compliance is more costly than increased reward. His 
last choice is box D. 
The subordinate would prefer box D with a high reward and 
only moderate compliance on his part. If he had to choose between 
A aud C, however, he would prefer box A because a reduction in rewards 
hurts him more than an increase in compliance. His last choice is 
Box B. 
The equilibrium result is of course the moderate level of 
reward and compliance, even though both individuals would be better 
off \'vith a high degree of reward and a high degree of compliance, 
The Pareto optimal result is not achieved because both superior and 
.subordinate have an incentive to break away from it. The supervisors 
quite naturally have an incentive to give less than the max-imum reward 
for subordinates, and the subordinates quite naturally have an incentive 
to float through their work situation with less than 100 percent effort. 
The important result is that in compliance situations as I 
have described them, there is a necessary and natural tendency towards 
high 
c ompliance 
Subordinate's 
Strategy 
Options 
moderat e 
c omplianc e 
Supervisor's Strategy Options 
high reward for 
subordinates 
A 
p 
Figure 4 
moderate reward 
B 
c 
Strategy Options and Outcomes for Generalized Compliance Game 
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suboptimality. Of course, not all supervisor-subordinate situations 
are as I have described them, The major exception, I would imagine, 
would be those work sit�ations in which the task assignment is itself 
rewarding, as for artists and professionals. Of course, these are 
also the situations in which hierarchical organizational arrangements 
are less common precisely because there is no problem of compliance 
perceived. 
XI. SUMMARY: HIERARCHY AND COMPLIANCE 
P�ior to World War II, the paradigm in public administration 
was a Wilsonian-Weberian model of organization which emphasized the 
concept of hierarchical control. Authority descended from the top in 
an organization, and it was assumed that subordinates must carry out 
orders in an automatic, virtually mechanistic way. Since World War IL. 
psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists have demonstrated 
myriad ways in which subordinates act as decisionmakers in their own 
right by forming informal organizations, by reacting perversely to 
certain styles of supervision, and by political bargaining with superiors 
and associates. In the reaction to the mechanistic model of organization, 
the concept of hierarchy has become rather an embarrassment since no one 
has 'quite shown how to incorporate both hierarchy and subordinate 
autonomy into a new paradigm for public administration. 
Niskanen's model of budget formation was clearly based on the 
recognition that the agency head (the subordinate of Congress in the 
Wilsonian paradigm) had autonomy. Yet his highly sophisticated theory 
suffers because, as Breton and Wintrobe point out, Niskanen completely 
24 
ignores the existence of hierarchical controls from the agency sponsor. 
The game on the unit square, I would suggest, is capable of incorpo­
rating both the idea of subordinate autonomy and hierarchical controls 
in a single analytical framework. The subordinate is an autonomous 
player in the game; yet he is subject to a reward-punishment strategy 
dimension that his superior manipulates by virtue of his position in 
a hierarchy. It is interesting to note that even a simple bureaucratic 
structure like this is subject to inefficiencies. 
In this paper the game on the unit square has been used to
analyze a single hierarchical relationship, that of governing party 
and agency head. However, the same mo.de of analysis could be used to 
analyze other hierarchical relationships throughout the chain of
command. It could even be used to develop a generalized model of 
bureaucratic compliance in which a subordinate has a strategy dimen­
sion denoting his degree of compliance (with a set of rules or a pro­
duction schedule, for instance) and the �uperior has a reward-punishment 
strategy dimension much like the governing party' s strategy dimension 
in this analysis. It would be interesting to see if such a mode of 
analysis could serve as an integrative framework for theories about 
hierarchical behavior at all levels in an organization. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. See Breton and Wintrobe, Hettich, and Migue and Belanger. 
2. Breton and Wintrobe, p. 198, 
27 
3. The shift from legislature to party in power as the analytical
sponsor or buyer of the agency's services has an advantage that
Breton and Wintrobe do not mention, The legislature is noted
for its conflict, rather than consensus, and is the prime example 
of an arena subject to cyclical or intransitive collective 
preferences. Niskanen's assumption that the agency sponsor has 
a unitary evaluation function is therefore very problematic. 
when the sponsor is viewed as a legislative body. The governing 
party can perhaps be viewed as being more likely to have a 
transitive collective preference structure, 
4. Breton and Wintrobe, p. ZOO. 
5, See Aranson and Ordeshook, Hinich and Ordeshook, and Riker and 
Ordeshook, pp. 307-337, 
6. See Nikaido and Isoda,
28 
7. This outcome is not in equilibrium because the agency head, for 
instance, would have a strong incentive to reduce his allocation 
of the agency budget to production of Q, This can be seen by 
noting that the slope of the agency head's payoff, with respect 
to his own strategy dimension, is strongly negative at the out­
come suggested. 
